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Secure Device Pairing via Handshake Detection
Zhenge Guo, Xueguang Gao, Qiang Ma , and Jizhong Zhao
Abstract: Multi-party applications are becoming popular due to the development of mobile smart devices. In this
work, we explore Secure Device Pairing (SDP), a novel pairing mechanism, which allows users to use smart
watches to detect the handshake between users, and use the shaking information to create security keys that
are highly random. Thus, we perform device pairing without complicated operations. SDP dynamically adjusts
the sensor’s sampling frequency and uses different classifiers at varying stages to save the energy. A multi-level
quantization algorithm is used to maximize the mutual information between two communicating entities without
information leakage. We evaluate the main modules of SDP with 1800 sets of handshake data. Results show that
the recognition accuracy of the handshake detection algorithm is 98.2%, and the power consumption is only 1/3 of
that of the single sampling frequency classifier.
Key words: device pairing; handshake detection; key extraction

1

Introduction

Recently, with the improvement of technology and
popularization of smart phones, smart watches, and
other smart devices, many multi-party applications are
becoming popular, such as file exchange, music sharing,
and cooperation games. In these applications, to achieve
face-to-face file sharing and payment, smart devices
are required to establish pairing relationships and
maintain synchronization to transfer data via wireless
communications, such as Bluetooth and WiFi.
Compared with cable network, wireless network
is vulnerable by a third party, because the wireless
channel is in public wireless transport protocol. To
avoid “man-in-the-middle attack”, both communicating
parties need to encrypt data transmission. Thus, safe
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data transmission with quick matching is highly
encouraged. Secure device pairing can establish a
secure communication channel between smart devices.
Thus, identifying the matching devices without any
previous knowledge is a major problem.
Traditional wireless communication technologies
rely on a secret key to realize equipment matching
and establish a secure channel[1, 2] . Both parties need to
negotiate a secret key before establishing a connection
and then manually input the key on the device to
complete equipment matching. During communication,
they also need to use a secret key to encrypt the data and
protect the transmission content. A regular process of
device pairing needs both parties to consciously enter
the secret key manually, and the pairing security is
related to the length and complexity of the secret key. If
the design of a secret key is too complex, then much
time is wasted on tedious negotiations. By contrast,
a simple key input leads to vulnerable pairing that
can be easily attacked by brute force. Beyond that, a
quick response code, although popular, faces the risk of
leakage by a nearby person or camera.
Near Field Communication (NFC)[3] is a well-known
and widely used method to achieve device pairing. NFC
has evolved from the integration of non-contact radio
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frequency identification technology. It is considered
short-range high-frequency wireless technology. By
combining an inductive card reader, inductive card,
and peer-to-peer function on a single chip, it can
identify compatible devices and exchange data within a
short range. Fast and simple pairing are its advantages.
However, NFC requires special hardware support,
because not all the intelligent devices are equipped
with NFC hardware. Moreover, it only works in a short
range.
Many researchers have proposed other useful
methods. Authors in Refs. [4–7] realized device pairing
by extracting the secret key from variations in WiFi
signal intensity. Point and Connect[8] is based on
swing pairing mode. With acoustic Doppler effect,
it calculates the change in distance when we swing
equipment to the other party to complete equipment
pairing. On the basis of trajectory similarity, Sethi et
al.[9] proposed the use of fingers to slide on the two
screens simultaneously to implement pairing between
the devices. However, two problems remain in these
pairing methods.
 First, device pairing is complex, and the
interaction is inconvenient. To pair the equipment,
people have to do some specific actions, such
as entering a password, scanning a 2D code, or
swinging the mobile phone, but these actions are
unnatural and may even provoke antipathy.
 Second, existing pairing methods do not provide
high security, and they are more likely to cause key
leakage, such as typing passwords and scrolling on
screen. Therefore, a pairing method that is safe and
convenient is urgently needed.
To solve the above mentioned problems, we
propose Secure Device Pairing (SDP), a novel pairing
method based on the handshaking perception. SDP
includes two mechanisms: handshake perception
mechanism and key extraction mechanism, as shown
in Fig. 1. Through the use of smart watches to sense
handshakes between people to record sensor data, i.e.,
acceleration and gyroscope, SDP can extract the secret
key from the sensor data to realize equipment pairing.
In summary, the main contributions of SDP are as
follows:
(1) First, SDP detects the handshake action in real
time by extracting acceleration, gyroscope, and
other sensors’ information from smart watches. To
realize high precision and low energy consumption of
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Fig. 1

Overview of SDP.

perception, SDP also designs a handshake detection
mode that can dynamically adjust the sampling
frequency, select a classifier, adopt different sampling
frequencies to fit the different stages of handshaking,
and identify by using different classifiers.
(2) Second, shaking is consistent when we shake
hands, so the sensor data selected by acceleration and
gyroscope sensor are highly similar. Data are a shared
and agreed random source. Given that a third party
has no access to similar data, we employ sensor data
to extract a similar key.
(3) Third, we evaluate SDP through handshake
perception and key security. On the basis of different
sampling frequencies and classifiers, we conduct
several handshaking motion perception experiments
and determine the best combination of sampling
frequency and classifier.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 discusses the related work. In Section 3, we describe
the overall design of the system. In Section 4, we
introduce the details of SDP on how to detect the
handshake action in real time. We introduce how to
extract and negotiate the key in Section 5, and report the
experimental settings and results in Section 6. Section
7 concludes the paper and presents the future work.

2

Related Work

Secure and rapid pairing between devices is a matter of
concern for multi-party applications. A simple method
uses a common password, so the two sides must agree
and share a common password. This kind of method is
based on interpersonal negotiation. If the password is
simple, then it can be easily cracked by brute force; if
it is complex, then it is hard to share. If pairing uses
manual password entry, leaks are difficult to prevent.
We classify the existing approaches as follows.
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Wireless channel-based technology. References
[10–12] assume the use of a wireless channel,
wherein pairing generates and exchanges keys. Their
approaches generated a key via wireless signal strength
that resulted from the open channel between the
devices. The shortcoming of this approach is the
low key generation rate, minimal information, and
poor security. References [13, 14] used wireless
Channel State Information (CSI) to generate a key.
Compared with wireless signal strength, CSI contains
30 subcarriers, which enable additional information and
high sensitivity. However, the subcarrier is dependent
on one another, and its correlation will influence the
entropy of the generated key.
Acoustic-based technology. References [15–17]
generated keys by sound. On the basis of the devices
position background sound, the key is obtained from the
frequency domain information and pairing is completed
through fast Fourier transform changes. Reference [18]
realized a safe channel through sound, and Dhwani[19]
further used sound signals to imitate the hardware
NFC to reach the goal in communicating in the near
field. A microphone and speaker can be used to
realize safe communication and pairing in the near
field on cellphones without pairing hardware NFC.
However, the limitations of the microphone may lead
to inconsistent information and low security in key.
To improve security, we need to increase the sampling
time, which increases the difficulty of matching.
Gesture-based technology. Spartacus[20] generated
keys based on gestures and completed pairing. The
key results from the changes in distance between the
devices, which is calculated from the Doppler effect of
acoustics when swinging one phone to another. Given
that the phone is swinging toward the target, the target
device displays the largest change in distance to help
realize pairing. This method is simple, but security is
low. Swinging one’s arms widely is a strange action, so
the implementing degree is not high.
Castelluccia and Mutaf[21] proposed jittering together
two devices to complete matching by comparing the
similarity in equipment acceleration changes. However,
the matching process needs to involve Diffie-Hellman
agreement to negotiate a temporary key for data
encryption transmission. The process is complex but
vulnerable to attack. Bichler et al.[22] improved this
method by cancelling the temporary key negotiation
process; both matches do not need to send the sensor
data to each other. Jitter information is extracted
via principal component analysis and divided into
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N classes for matching. However, the defect of this
method is lower key randomness and security.
Reference [23] paired devices together by extracting
a key from screen trajectory generated from two
fingers scrolling on the device simultaneously. This
approach displays trajectory characteristics and key
length is guaranteed. The third party cannot easily
obtain trajectory, so matching security is high. Its
disadvantage is that the equipment should be placed
on a plane at the same time, and two fingers must be
used to scroll on the plane simultaneously. Its special
requirements are large screen size scene, and inability
to be applied outside. Igaze[24] used intelligent glasses
to determine a simple equipment matching method.
The glasses deploy two cameras: one is for shooting
an object in front of the eyes, and another is for
filming the wearers’ eyeballs to determine the sight
direction. Pairing needs both users wearing the glasses
to look at each other for a certain time period. Sight
direction is opposite, and both sides must look at each
other to complete matching. This pairing method is
simple, but requires eye-to-eye gaze of more than 3 s to
calculate accurately the direction. Moreover, it is not in
agreement with daily communication habits and cannot
be applied in practice.

3

System Overview

SDP mainly consists of two parts based on handshaking
perception: handshaking perception and key extraction.
Handshake perception is responsible for processing the
collected sensor data in real time and testing handshake
behavior. The key extraction module is responsible
for extracting the key of equipment pairing and
communication encryption from the collected sensor
data in handshaking. Overall, SDP is mainly composed
of four modules, as shown in Fig. 2.
(1) Module of detecting stretched hand. The main
function of the module is to detect real-time data from
the sensor whether they stretch their hands before
shaking.
Detection on
stretch hand
Hand
classifier
Feature
extraction

Detection on
shaking hands

Key
extraction

Key
negotiation

Jitter classifier

Quantitative
processing

Privacy
amplification

Feature
extraction

Sensor data

Information
coordination

Denoising and
normalized

Fig. 2

Architecture of SDP.
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(2) Module of detecting handshake. Shaking hands
is the main action of a handshake, which contains rich
information. The module will accurately identify sensor
data collected through the handshake action and correct
identification errors of the module of stretching hand
perception.
(3) Module of key extraction. The module extracts
the initial key by processing highly similar sensor data
that are collected through the intelligent equipment.
(4) Module of key negotiation. Given that the
sensor data display differences, quantitative process
can eliminate most of the inconsistent phenomenon,
but the generated initial key may still exhibit certain
mismatch. The module uses key negotiation to
eliminate inconsistencies and further ensures the safety
of the key.
A summary of symbols is shown in Table 1.

4

Handshake Perception Mechanism

SDP aims to achieve pairing between intelligent devices
through the natural action of a handshake. The first step
is to detect the handshake action in real time. The
scheme is to detect handshakes automatically by using
sensors in smart watches, and the following extraction
of a secret key and consultation work can be completed.
After careful observation and analysis on handshakes,
SDP designs a special handshake recognition algorithm
based on the features of hand action to recognize
hand action with high efficiency and low energy
consumption. We divide handshake action into two
stages to study stretch out and jitter. Considering
the identification requirements at different stages
of handshake and the energy consumption in the
Table 1

Main symbols of our proposed method.

Symbol
Meaning
G
Gravity
acc
Total acceleration
fs
Sampling frequency
N
Sampling number
X.k/
Relative amplitude of k discrete frequency points
Wn
Rotation factor
K.Xi ; Xj /
Radial basis
Ka
Pairing key of A
Sa
Sound signal of A
Ttrans
Amount of time the data is in the air
Thandle
Delay of the equipment processing signal

Mean value of sensing data
Parameters of kernel function
˛
Quantitative parameters

entire identification module, we propose a recognition
algorithm that can dynamically adjust the sampling
frequency and classifier handshake gesture. The
algorithm is divided into two modules: stretching hand
detection module and handshaking detection module.
The main goal of the stretching hand detection
module is to test the stage of stretching hand with
low energy consumption, extract the tiny characteristics
from the low sampling sensor, and recognize the
stretching hand by low-power classification algorithm.
The main goal of the handshake recognition module
is to screen out the possible stretching hand action
through the stream of sensor data to prepare for
testing the handshakes in the future. Thus, it allows
certain recognition errors because these errors can be
eliminated in the handshake jitter recognition module.
When the possible stretching hand action is identified,
the system will go into the handshake jitter detection
module, improve the sensors sampling frequency,
calculate the good characteristics of classification, and
use the high recognition rate to identify the handshake.
Notably, this work ignores camera-based attack due
to two reasons. Our experiment should be conducted in
public places, which only provide some low-definition
cameras or non-camera scenarios. High-definition
cameras are uncommon for monitoring use in public
places. In addition, our algorithm of pairing mechanism
needs data from 3D coordinates. Nevertheless, even if
high-definition cameras are present, they can only shoot
the shaking action into 2D coordinates; thus, the data
are insufficient for cracking.
4.1
4.1.1

Hand motion detection
Hand motion load-point detection

Given that the system continuously receives the sensor
returning data, to save computing resources and energy
consumption, we need to filter out non-handshake time
data prior to analysis.
SDP makes use of acceleration threshold method
to filter out the free data. Experiments prove that the
sensor data are not constant. Even if the user has no
action, the sensor data have a certain degree of volatility
for the influence of sensors thermal and environmental
noise. Therefore, the acceleration should be close to
zero when the hand is resting. The formula of total
acceleration is shown in Eq. (1):
ˇq
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
acc D ˇ acc2x C accy2 C acc2z gravityˇ
(1)
When users incur hand movements, the sensor data
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will change considerably and the total acceleration
value will increase, so the action and non-action areas
can be separated by setting threshold. To prevent too
large or too small threshold from delaying the test or
producing more errors of judgment, we use the wrong
amount threshold method to determine the load-point
hand movements.
4.1.2

Hand feature extraction

We cannot directly send the sensor data to the classifier
to classify and recognize hand motion, because the raw
data are substantial and contain noise and error. We
extract the corresponding hand characteristics by using
certain hand movements and then identify hand motion
(expressed as eigenvalue).
Based on our observations, when users shake hands,
they move their arms first, and then reach out their
hands to the other party. Figure 3 reflects the signal
changes in accelerated speed and gyro sensor during the
process. Combined with the characteristics of sensor
data and hand motion, SDP extracts the following key
features from hand action to reflect the hand motion.
(1) Average, variance, and extremum in
equipment acceleration
When a hand hangs in a natural state before a
handshake, its speed will be zero, and the acceleration
is gravitational acceleration. The speed of motion will
begin to increase slowly when we reach our hands and
eventually decrease after the peak. When two hands
come into contact with each other, the hand will stay
in static state and the speed will return to zero. The
corresponding changes in acceleration increase slowly
at first and then decrease slowly after the maximum, as
shown in Fig. 3.
(2) Angle, variance, and extremum in equipment
rotation

2

Acceleration (m/s )

10

X axis
Y axis
Z axis

5
0
-5

-10
-15
0
100
200
300
Sampling sequence number
(a) Accelerometer

15
Angular velocity (rad/s)

15

10

X axis
Y axis
Z axis

5
0
-5
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During hand motion, the wrist demonstrates space
displacement and does the corresponding rotation to
hold together. The gyroscope can record rotating
angular velocity during this process. Thus, we can
reflect wrist rotation by calculating angular velocity
data’s variance and standard deviation. As shown in
Fig. 3, when we stretch out our hands, turning will
mainly occur on the X axis and Z axis.
(3) Hand rotation angle
Given the limitation of wrist-watches and hand
movements, moving distance and rotating angle are
strongly correlated when we stretch out our hands, but
the error is small if we only use the first integral process
to obtain the rotation angle through a gyroscope.
Therefore, this article uses the rotation angle as a
feature.
The aforementioned method considers the reflect
degree of hand motion characteristics and complexity
of calculation. It ensures the detection of hand motion
under low power.
4.1.3

Hand action classifier

After calculating the above features from the sensor’s
raw data, SDP will complete hand motion detection
and identification before shaking hands by using the
decision tree classification algorithm. Two reasons are
shown. (1) Compared with the algorithm of neural
network and Support Vector Machine (SVM), the
decision tree algorithm is simpler and involves low
amount of calculation and low energy consumption. (2)
The experiment showed that the decision tree algorithm
of classification accuracy can meet the needs of the hand
detection module under low power consumption.
Decision tree is a tree structure where each leaf
node represents a category, and each nonleaf node
represents a feature test. A decision tree’s classification
process starts from the root node, according to the test
samples to select the corresponding values as different
branches, until reaching the leaf nodes. The leaf nodes
represent the final classification result of the decision
tree. SDP chooses the C4.5 decision tree scheme and
uses information gain rate as the basis of property
division.

-10

4.2

-15
0
100
200
300
Sampling sequence number

After testing hand motion, the system will enter into
the handshake jitter detection module. The system will
improve the sensors sampling frequency before the
handshaking test, so it can increase the success rate
of hand detection and improve the success rate of

(b) Gyroscope

Fig. 3 Signal changes in accelerated speed and gyro sensor
during the process.

Handshake test
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key generation. Similar to the hand detection module,
to reduce the amount of calculation and improve
the classification precision, SDP extracts handshake
features from sensor data, which can be distinguished
from other actions, and classifies these features.
4.2.1

Handshake feature extraction

When shaking hands, both hands clench each other and
are shaken up and down for an uncertain time. SDP first
extracts the following features from the time domain
signal to describe a handshake.
(1) Mean and variance. The characteristics have
already been stated above.
(2) Correlation coefficient between the three axis
sensor data. This coefficient represents the correlation
between variables and close degree of index, and it is
expressed as follows:
Pn
x/.y
N i y/
N
i D1 .xi
r D qP
(2)
P
n
n
x/
N 2  i D1 .yi y/
N 2
iD1 .xi
(3) Number and size of extremum. Extremum
number reflects the number of handshaking in unit time,
whereas size reflects the highest jitter acceleration. To
obtain extreme value point information, SDP adopts
a four-order Butterworth low-pass filter to filter the
original data, changes the signal after filtering, and
analyzes the change state of different symbols.
(4) Interquartile range. Interquartile range, or
quartile deviation, is used to describe the distribution
of signals.
Compared with the time domain signals, the
frequency domain signal can easily reflect some
characteristics of movement. SDP gains not only the
above characteristics from the time domain signal but
also the frequency domain signal from the raw sensor
data by discrete Fourier transform. If the original signal
set is fs =N , then the frequency domain signals after
transformation are as follows:
X.k/ D

N
X1

x.n/WNk n ; k

D 1; 2; :::; N

(3)

nD0

WN D e

j 2N

(4)

In Eqs. (3) and (4), X.k/ is the relative amplitude
of N discrete frequency points that corresponding to
X.n/ input sequence, if the sampling frequency is fs ,
X.k/ expresses relative amplitude N frequency points
that get from the frequency fs =2 to the fs =2 fs =N ,
fs =N is the frequency space. WN is the rotation factor.

Combined with respective features in the time
and frequency domains, we obtain the characteristic
vector, which can distinguish the handshaking and
non-handshaking movements. In the next section, we
describe how to use the feature vector to realize
handshake classifier.
4.2.2

Handshaking classifier design

SDP designs an SVM classifier to achieve the
classification of the handshake action. The extracting
jitter feature is linearly inseparable in the original
space, so we need to use kernel functions to reflect the
original data to a high-order space. The paper adopts the
radial basis that can be used in handshake movement
classification as a handshake action SVM classifier’s
kernel function. Radial basis is expressed in Eq. (5):


jXi Xj j2
K.Xi ; Xj / D exp
(5)
2r 2
where r is considered the original parameter on behalf
of the radius of kernel function. It is usually set by
actual conditions and defaults to the reciprocal of the
classification number.
In brief, we summarize the handshaking classifier
building process into four steps:
(1) Collecting handshaking’s training sample,
calculating the characteristics from the sensor data, and
gaining the feature vector;
(2) Improving bracelet speed and classification
accuracy to prevent the precision of classification,
which is caused by the influence of different data
scales;
(3) Using the feature vector to train classifier and
obtaining the optimal model parameters by crossvalidation and network search algorithms;
(4) Handshake detection phase.

5

Key Extraction and Negotiation

Key extraction refers to the key generation process in
which both handshaking collected data are obtained
from their highly similar sensors. The model is shown
in Fig. 4.
During a handshake, legitimate users A and B can use
the sensor to test the handshake and gain highly similar
sensor data (i.e., X and Y, respectively). Illegal user E
can only obtain jitter information by observing, and its
data sharply differ from X and Y. However, there are
some differences between X and Y because of error in
both sensors. As a result, A and B need to be in an open
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letter to negotiate for the final consistent pairing of keys
Ka and Kb .
To enter the market early, researchers need to
overcome the following challenges in the process:
(1) Inconsistent sensor data.
Inconsistency is
caused by three factors. (a) Both sensors have
no prior synchronization mechanism, so the sensor
data collected on time are unaligned, leading to
inconsistent data. (b) Sensor precision is not high
in smart watches and bracelet configurations due to
measurement error; thus, the same handshake action
will produce inconsistent sensory data. (c) Even though
both hands are clenched, subtle differences can cause
data inconsistency.
(2) The above key extraction cannot guarantee
that both sides will yield a consistent initial key. In
response to the above two challenges, SDP first
realizes both sensor data alignment by sound. Second,
SDP designs a multi-level quantization algorithm to
eliminate the error of the sensor data and obtain the
initial key. Finally, SDP uses the key agreement and
privacy amplification techniques to further eliminate the
inconsistency between the initial keys.
5.1

Data alignment technique

To ensure that both sides obtain the same key from
the sensors, we must be certain that both sides extract
the sensor data are aligned on time. When both sides
use their own smart devices to collect data and employ
recorded timestamps, time errors may exist because of
the time inconsistency between the two devices. We
propose a time synchronization method based on event
detection and sound signal.
Suppose A and B are both parties. At Ta1 , A detects
a shaking event and then begins to send sound signal
Sa on behalf of the handshake immediately. At Tb1 ,
B detects Sa sent by A. Similarly, at Tb2 , B detects
the handshake event and sends signal Sb which can be

627

detected by A at Ta2 . After comparing T1 and T2 , the
latter is selected as the initial point (i.e., Ta2 for A and
Tb2 for B) to realize time synchronization.
Given that the transmission and signal processing
also need to consume a certain amount of time, the
relation between Ta2 and Tb2 is shown in Eq. (6):
Ta2 D Tb2 C Ttrans C Thandle
(6)
Ttrans is the amount of time for data in air, and Thandle is
the delay for equipment processing signal. Data travel
fast, and both sides are close when they shake hands.
The propagation delay is 0.3 ms, the sensor sampling
frequency is 200 Hz, and sampling interval is 5 ms; thus,
propagation delay can be ignored. Thandle is a fixed value
at 1.2 GHz because the CPU frequency of smart devices
is high, and the time needed for processing sound is less
than 5 ms, which can be ignored.
5.2

Initial key extraction

We obtain two groups of real vectors X and Y after data
alignment, so the real number should be switched to a
binary string to easily pair the key.
A simple quantization algorithm can directly
calculate the mean value of sensor data, the maximum,
and the minimum to obtain two quantization intervals
Œmin; / and .; max, and discard boundary threshold
data. The quantitative
formula is as follows:
8
ˆ
x 2 . C ˛  ; maxI
< 1;
Q.x/ D
(7)
0;
x 2 Œmin;  ˛   /I
ˆ
: 1; x 2 Œ ˛  ;  C ˛   
In Eq. (7),  is standard deviation. We discard the
sensor date greater to 1, so it can transform every real
sensor data into their corresponding bit value 0, 1 to
determine the initial key.
Thus, three problems need to be solved during key
extraction:
(1) Problem of threshold boundary. Under the
presence of error, A and B obtain the data at the same
point of quantitative data. One may be located above
the threshold boundary, and another is located below
the threshold boundary. They are assigned to different
quantization intervals and result in different keys.
(2) The initialization data display the bit value of 0
or 1, the initial key length is limited, and security is
low. Fine division of original data can retain additional
original information and improve security but increase
the key conflict rate and decrease the pairing degree.
(3) When all the data use the same threshold value to
quantify, a considerable amount of information is lost in
the process, thereby decreasing the initial key entropy.
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To solve the above problems, SDP adopts the multilevel quantitative method to generate the initial key.
First, the key is extracted through the whole handshake
movement rules. The original sensor is then divided
multiple into fixed small pieces. The mean obtained
by calculating block data is used for quantitative
processing of the whole block data, and the key that can
reflect the overall handshake movement is extracted.
Second, the hand movement’s local rule is extracted
in each part of time. Local quantization threshold is
determined according to local rule. It is used to quantize
the data locally, retain as much local information as
possible, and increase the extraction of randomness and
security. Finally, we combine the keys generated by two
parts to generate the initial matching key.
5.3

Key agreement

Both sides will be able to obtain the same length initial
key after the above steps. The quantitative process
cannot fully eliminate the difference between the sensor
data, so certain errors may be encountered before
generating initial key. Both parties must make the
necessary key agreement to ensure the consistency of
the key. We set the key agreement algorithm as follows.
(1) Both sides permute the initial key in random
with the same rules so that the error bit is allocated in
random. Subsequently the initial key is divided into the
length of N D 2m , where m is the length of bits. For
m > 3, every parity bit is calculated and sent to the
other party through a public channel.
(2) When each piece parity bit is exchanged, some
information is leaked to a third party; therefore, both
sides need to throw away single data to ensure that the
key is not leaked. For the remaining data 2m 1, we
need to assess the results of parity. If the results are the
same, no additional processing is required, and we can
continue with the next block. If the result is different, a
hamming code Œ2m 1; 2m 1 m is composed.
(3) The concomitant formulas S1 and S2 of both
hamming codes are calculated and sent to each other
through a public channel.
(4) The calibration factor’s S D S1 ˚S2 is calculated.
We can then determine if there are wrong bits or not
based on the value of S. If S D 0, there is no error;
the error may already be abandoned but three or more
unnoticeable errors may remain. If S is not equal to
zero, then there is an error (one or odd number). If the
error is located on the S corresponding binary numbers,
we can adopt the inverted value of S . If three or
more errors are encountered, then we cannot determine
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whether the error is increased or decreased. Given that
the sending is on a public channel, we need to give up
these bits to prevent information leakage.
(5) Steps 1–4 are repeated until the error is not found.
For example, assuming that the initial values of the
keys A and B are 01011101 and 01011111. First, A
sends the parity check code 1 of its own key to B,
and B sends its own parity check code 0 to A. The
two sides show that their parity codes are inconsistent,
so they all give up the first bit and use the remaining
array as hamming code, when the hamming codes
of A and B are 1011101 and 1011111, respectively.
After calculation, the syndrome of A is 101, and the
syndrome of B is 111, and then sent to each other.
After calculation, the exclusive-OR gate of syndromes
is 010. The two parties find that the error location in the
original key is in the second bit. Finally, the two sides
discard the check bits and obtain the final generated key
of 1011.
5.4

Privacy amplification

Two problems may be encountered if we directly
use the consistent key into equipment matching and
communication encryption.
(1) The handshake has certain regularity, so the key
exhibits continuous 0, 1 bit during key extraction, which
can reduce security because of the correlation.
(2) During the negotiation, the two sides send
some letters through a public channel. Although has
been abandoned design key part, it revealed some
information to potential attacker.
To eliminate the above problems and enhance the
security of key generation, we need to amplify privacy.
Through a compression function to remove some
information that may be obtained by an attacker, the
original key should be compressed to the absolute
security key. Privacy amplification generally uses the
hash function to deal with the initial key to obtain a
short security key. Thus, even if an attacker obtains
some initial information and the hash function used
for security enhancement, it still cannot acquire any
information of the final key. SDP uses the SHA1[25]
as a confidential enhanced hash function. SHA1 can
generate messages that are less than 264 to the message
digested with 160 bits.

6
6.1

Evaluation
System implementation

On the basis of the Android wear intelligent platform,
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Table 2
Watch.

Hardware comparison between Nexus 4 and LG G

Hardware parameter
Type
RAM
CPU
CPU requency
Sampling frequency

Nexus 4
Smart Phone
2 GB
APQ8064
1.5 GHz
200 Hz

LG G Watch
Smart Watch
0.5 GB
Snapdragon 400
1.2 GHz
200 Hz

negative sample. We use 3600 sets of data to train and
verify the handshaking classifier.
6.2

Experimental results and analysis

6.2.1

Influence of sampling frequency for hand
detection accuracy

In previous sections, we have discussed the relationship
between the sampling frequency and recognition rate.
SDP collects sensor data from 10 people during the
stretching out of hands, and each individual stretches
out his or her hands 20 times. Raw data adopt the
highest sampling frequency of 200 Hz as sample. We
use different frequencies to resample in subsequent
hand detection. The results are shown in Fig. 5.
As Fig. 5 shows, when the sampling frequency is
small, the recognition rate is low, because the sampling
frequency is low. Thus, motion information cannot be
captured easily, and the error can be identified. With
the increase in sampling frequency, the classification
accuracy is improved. However, after reaching a certain
degree, the accuracy no longer increases significantly
because the person’s hand movements are mainly
concentrated in the low frequency range. Based on
the Nyquist sampling theorem, when the sampling
frequency is more than twice the maximum frequency
signal, information can be fully retained in the original
signal. When the general sampling frequency is 5–
10 times for the highest frequency signal, the original
information can be fully reflected.
Considering energy consumption and recognition
accuracy, we choose 30 Hz as the detection
and sampling frequency. This value implements
classification accuracy and energy balance. The final
classification results are shown in Table 3.
In Table 3, precision is calculated using Eq. (8):
TP
Precision D
(8)
TP C FP
100
97
Accuracy (%)

this paper realizes detection module. Android wear
is the new open intelligence platform created by
Google to use for smart watches, and it allows third
parties to manufacture a wide variety of devices to be
compatible in Android wear. We realize the extraction
of acceleration and gyro sensor data through the API
provided by the Android wear system, as well as the
adjustment of the sensor sampling frequency.
We complete the interaction between smart watches
and mobile phones through Google Play Service,
realize the information interaction between the watches
and phones through Bluetooth 4.0 technology, and
implement key extraction and privacy amplification
to reduce the amount of calculations. We realize
SVM via LIBSVM software package, which was
invented by Professor Lin and others in Taiwan
University. SVM provides a variety of functions, such
as pattern recognition and regression, and enables the
use of cross-validation and grid search for optimal
classifier parameter selection. SDP implements the
SVM classifier in the Android system by using Java
code to complete the recognition of hand action.
The experiment involves the equipment LG G Watch
and Google Nexus 4 and their hardware is shown in
Table 2.
The experiment collects handshaking data from ten
users (two females and eight males). Every two people
have four sets of handshakes; each set involves 10
shakes, resulting in a total data of 1800 times. In these
four sets, two sets are normal one-hand shaking, one set
is two-hand shaking, and one set is a random handshake
with unfixed jitter frequency and amplitude to increase
key randomness. While shaking hands, the sensor data
are collected using the worn LG smart watch to carry
out handshake detection and key extraction. At the
same time, the ten users are asked to wear the watch
for eating, walking, running, drinking water, typing,
and other daily activities. The sensor data of these
activities are recorded. We also collect 1800 sets of
non-handshaking data and use them as the classifier’s
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Fig. 5 Relationship of sampling frequency and hand
detection accuracy.
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Table 3

Outstretched hand detection accuracy rate.
Precision (%) Recall (%) Accuracy (%)

Stretch hand
Non-stretch hand

86.9
98.0

98.3
85.2

91.8

where TP (True Positive) refers to the true class that is
judged to be positive, and FP (False Positive) refers to
the false class that is judged to be negative.
Recall refers to the recall rate, which is also known
as the True Positive Rate (TPR). The recall rate reflects
the proportion of positive samples that are properly
classified as total positive samples. The recall rate is
expressed as follows:
TP
Recall D
(9)
TP C FN
where FN (False Negative) refers to the negative class
that was wrongly judged to be positive class.
Accuracy refers to the accuracy rate, which reflects
the classifier’s judgment ability to the whole sample.
Accuracy is expressed as follows:
TP C TN
Accuracy D
(10)
TP C FP C TN C FN
where TN (True Negative) refers to the false class
that was judged to be negative. After adjusting the
decision tree’s threshold, the recognition precision rate
is normal. About 15% of non-shaking activities will
be considered hand movements. Some actions, such
as taking something, giving something to others, or
touching heads, are similar to stretching out one’s hand
before shaking. The system cannot distinguish such
activities easily by using the limited characteristics with
low sampling frequency, but its recall rate is high,
and it can detect 98.3% hand movements. Thus, the
misjudgment of hand movements can use the following
handshake jitter detector for further elimination. The
hand action classifier is then achieved to realize
preliminary screening under low energy consumption.
6.2.2 Recognition rate in handshaking
We choose SVM as a handshaking detection classifier
that is based on Radial Basis Function (RBF), so
we need to confirm the penalty parameters C and
first. This paper is based on cross-validation and
grid search query to determine the optimal parameter
combination. Cross-validation divides the raw data into
K groups and collects one group as test group; the other
groups are training groups used for training and testing.
Classification accuracy depends on the mean value of K
models accuracy. Grid search allows C and to divide
the grid within a certain scope, fetching values from

all possible points. Cross-validation is then employed
for classification accuracy. After traversing all points in
the grid, the highest accuracy’s group C and are the
optimal parameters of SVM. In this experiment, we set
the number of cross-validation group K at 10. C and
are Œ2 5 ; 215  and Œ2 15 ; 23 , respectively. As shown
in Fig. 6, when C = 0.5 and = 0.125, recognition
accuracy is the highest at 97.8%.
Compared with a singular classifier, this study
verifies dynamic adjustment sampling frequency,
classifier recognition rate, and system power
consumption via experiments. We operate 20 groups.
Each group includes two people (one deploys the
detection system mentioned in the paper, and another
deploys fixed sampling frequency SVM). Each
experiment lasts for 1 h, during which the participants
conduct normal activities, such as typing, playing
games, and drinking. During 10 times of handshaking
behavior, we record the initial and final watch power
values. Finally, we complete the statistics on the
handshake recognition rate and energy consumption.
The test results are shown in Table 4. Given that
we adopt the dynamic adjustment sensor sampling
frequency and use two different classifiers, this system
significantly reduced the entire identification system’s
energy consumption.
As shown in Fig. 7, after running for 1 h, the
power consumption of this system is about 4%, but
the fixed sampling frequency SVM classifier consumes
more than 11%. The system’s power consumption is
only about one-third of the single SVM classifier,
Table 4

Handshake detection recognition rate.
Precision (%) Recall (%) Accuracy (%)

HS
Non-HS
HS
DT+SVM
Non-HS

Single SVM

97.2
98.4
99.3
96.8

98.4
97.2
97.6
98.9

97.8
98.2

-14

Log2 (γ)

630

97.5%
-12 97.0%
96.5%
-10 96.0%
95.5%
-8 95.0%
-6
-4
-2
-5

0

5

10

15

Log2 (C)

Fig. 6

Handshake recognition rate for different classifiers.
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6.2.3

6.2.5

10
8
6
4
Single SVM

Decision tree SVM

Fig. 7

Power consumption of two classifiers.

Quantitative parameters’ influence on the
key

The experimental results are shown in Fig. 8. When
˛ is small, many inconsistent bits after quantization
assessment are available. when ˛ is 0.3, the number of
inconsistent bits is close to 0. When you increase ˛, you
do not acquire much revenue. Instead, you increase the
number of discarded sensor data and reduce the number
of bits that generate the key. Thus, 0.3 is selected as the
final quantitative parameter ˛.
6.2.4

Initial key error rate

Given that the sensor data between the two sides
of the handshake are not completely consistent,
the two parties need to conduct multiple rounds
of key negotiation to divide these inconsistencies.
Experiments are conducted to verify the initial key
consistency after quantitative assessment, as well
as initial key similarities between the attacker and
both hand shakers. Experiments involve 100 times of
handshaking, with each time lasting for 2 s. An attacker
observes the behavior of hand shakers and imitates one
to shake hands. We extract the initial key from sensor
data collected from three sides, and the mismatching
rate of the initial key is shown in Fig. 9. Figure 9a
is the initial key error bit rate Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of the attacker, and Fig. 9b is the key
Inconsistent

2500

Discarded

The key generation rate is another important indicator
of matching system security. The more keys are
generated per unit time, the higher the system security
becomes. If the key generation rate is too slow, then
users need to shake hands for a long time for the same
bit digit key, thereby reducing the convenience of the
system.
When the sensor sampling frequency is 200 Hz,
this system uses the two axes of the accelerometer
and gyroscope data to collect 400 sensor data in
every second. To reduce error between the two sides,
the quantitative part of the data is abandoned. To
eliminate inconsistency, the part of the key during
key agreement is also abandoned, so the final key
generation rate is less than 400 bit/s. When the key
generation rate is accurately determined, SDP uses
the handshake data collected in the previous data to
carry out the key generation experiment (Fig. 10). We
can find that the average key generation rate is about
185 bit/s. Therefore, SDP collects 2 s of handshaking
data, producing about 370 bits of the initial key.
Subsequently, 160 bits of the key are obtained through
the algorithm SHA1 during privacy amplification to

Consistent

CDF

Number of bits

3000
2000

Key generation rate

1.0

1.0

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

CDF

Power consumption (%)

thereby achieving our system design goal of low power
consumption and high precision.

error bit rate CDF of the legitimate user. The diagrams
show that the key error bit rate is low; about 95% of
the error bit rate is less than 1.4%, and the highest is
1.7%. The matching degree of the attacker key error
rates is no less than 5%, and the highest is 40%.
An attacker can roughly imitate the action of hands
shaking, but they cannot simulate the tiny changes
during handshake action. This experiment shows that
the quantization algorithm is reliable. Moreover, the
hand shakers can generate similar keys and largely
avoid attacker-simulated attacks.

12

0.4

1500
1000

0.2

0.4
0.2

500
0

0.2

0.4
0.6
Value of a

0.8

1.0

Fig. 8 Quantitative parameters’ influence on the key
generation.
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3
4
Error rate (%)
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0

Fig. 9

0
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Error rate (%)
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Initial key error of attacker and legitimate user.
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Key generation rate.

complete pairing and encryption. It can ensure the
length of the key to reach safe requirements, reduce the
time of handshaking, and improve the convenience of
the matching process.

7

[7]

[8]

Conclusion and Future Work

We have introduced a handshake method (SDP) that
uses a wearable device to generate a highly secure
password and simplify device matching. SDP has three
contributions: designing high-precision handshake
identification technology, realizing low power
handshake monitoring mechanism, and completing
low energy consumption with high precision in key
pairs and communication encryption. Experiments
showed that this method realizes the design goal of
high precision and low energy. Several aspects can
be improved in the future. Increasing categories of
equipment can be used in this method; pairing is not
only limited to shaking hands but also for scenarios of
multiple device pairing.
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